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Teaching Images
Naomi Jewel Mezey
My early attempts at teaching students summary judgment taught me how
complex the topic is. I remember trying to convey the deceptively simple
task of deciding whether material facts were in genuine dispute. It was hard
enough for students to maneuver procedural standards in the suddenly factintensive, post-discovery environment. In the ontology of legal process,
facts are at once ordinary and mystical, concrete and fluid, everywhere and
nowhere. Once embedded in a lawsuit, facts are both overdetermined and
undercontextualized, flattened and shorn of their social meaning. But in
addition, summary judgment demands that facts be curated; they have to
be material to a claim. Materiality is a concept that, with the injection of
substantive law into the analysis, often confounds the first-year student. In
helping my students navigate the rich landscape of facts, I found it especially
difficult to get the students to appreciate how judges confronted a somewhat
contradictory task: to ask if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving
party and yet not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing the evidence.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) sets out the standard for granting
motions for summary judgment, requiring courts to take cases away from
juries and enter judgment as a matter of law when “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact.”1 Because disputes over facts are the unique province
of the jury, another way to frame the question of whether there is a genuine
factual dispute is to ask if a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving
party given the material in the record.2 If so, the case should not be disposed
of by the judge. For an issue to be genuine, the nonmoving party has to show
facts that put that issue in dispute, and the judge has to assess the proof.3
That judicial assessment is necessary because a genuine dispute is one that
is worthy of a jury; the modern standard requires that to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”4 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has held that assessing the record on summary judgment “necessarily
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implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at
the trial on the merits.”5 In other words, at summary judgment, a judge must
assess the evidence in light of the standard of proof and from the perspective
of a rational jury but must not usurp the role of the jury by weighing the
evidence.6 Applying this Zen koan is quite a bit to ask of a federal judge and
can be positively mind-bending for first-year students.
Disputes of Fact
To unravel the riddle of summary judgment, I often pose the most basic of
hypotheticals about a dispute over whether the traffic light was red or green
when the defendant went through it, causing an accident. The plaintiff’s theory
is that defendant was negligent in running a red light.7 The hypothetical poses
different kinds and degrees of factual evidence for each side to test the easy cases
of clear factual disputes, the easy cases of no factual disputes, and the difficult
cases of significantly unequal evidence. For example, I ask students how the
judge should rule on a motion for summary judgment by the defendant if
the defendant, in support of his motion, submits affidavits from ten witnesses
who say the light for defendant was green, and the plaintiff, in opposing the
motion, submits her own affidavit stating that she observed the light and it was
red. This is a hard question for students; viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and through the lens of the burden of proof,
the plaintiff’s affidavit surely does more than a raise a metaphysical doubt. Yet,
putting aside the credibility of the witnesses, which is clearly the job of a jury,
could a reasonable jury find for the plaintiff?
As the students are struggling with that last question, I offer them an
alternative. They can ignore the confounding phantasm of the ten hypothetical
witnesses for the defendant. What if the defendant supports his motion for
summary judgment with a single video that suggests that his light was green,
and the plaintiff responds with her own affidavit again that she observed the
defendant’s light to be red. Relief spreads through the class. A video changes
everything. They overwhelmingly conclude that the judge should grant
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. No rational jury could find for
the plaintiff in the face of evidence so compelling and infallible as a video.
Sometimes there is a lone dissenter, or a smattering of skeptics. Sometimes
not. Digital experts though they are, my students tend to be visually
guileless. Their first assumption is that a video is more conclusive than other
demonstrative or documentary evidence and certainly more reliable than
testimonial evidence. Their reactions suggest that the videos that circulate on
the Internet, uploaded from cell phones or police body cameras, are a new kind
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of evidence, perhaps “experiential” evidence in that the images allow them
to experience the event.8 They are fairly confident that summary judgment
would be appropriate in the face of a factual dispute in which one side has
experiential evidence and the other side does not. So I ask them questions
that I hope will lead them to reassess their confidence in the imagined images
on the defendant’s video. I ask them what it means for a video “to suggest”
the light was green. What do they imagine the video showed? What kinds
of images would be most compelling? What kinds of images would speak to
material facts? Do they need additional information about the video to assess
its reliability? Can they assess its reliability without weighing the evidence? A
few change their minds, but it’s a hypothetical about a hypothetical video. It
is far too abstract, and they imagine anything they want.
So I show them a real video. It is the video from the Supreme Court’s case
of Scott v. Harris.9 But before they know anything about that video, I give the
students the following exercise developed from the case.
An Exercise
At 10:42 p.m. on March 29, 2001, Deputy Sheriff Clinton Reynolds was
stationed on Georgia Highway 34 when he clocked a vehicle traveling at
seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone. Although
Reynolds flashed his blue lights, the driver refused to slow down and continued
driving. Reynolds made a decision to pursue the driver.
Through his radio, Reynolds learned that the car was registered to Victor
Harris, and it was not stolen. It is undisputed that Harris, who was also the
driver, had registered the car at his own address. Reynolds did not report that
he was pursuing the vehicle because the driver had been speeding.
Reynolds followed Harris, using his flashing lights in an attempt to get
Harris to pull over. When Harris did not stop, Reynolds turned on his lights
and siren, which activated his video camera. Harris not only refused to stop
but sped up, beginning a high-speed chase. According to Harris, whose
testimony was not disputed, he didn’t stop because he was scared, wanted to
get home, and was hoping to avoid an impound fee for his car. Harris admits
that during the course of the pursuit, he drove well in excess of the speed
limits, passed vehicles on a double yellow line, and ran a green light. Despite
these traffic violations, Harris used his turn signals when passing or turning,
maintained control of his car, and slowed before passing cars in his lane to
check for oncoming traffic.
Officer Timothy Scott, who had heard Reynolds’ radio communication,
decided to join the pursuit. At one point, Harris slowed, signaled, and turned
into the parking lot of a shopping complex. There were no pedestrians or other
vehicles in the parking lot. Reynolds followed Harris, and Scott proceeded to
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the opposite side of the complex in an attempt to cut Harris off. As Harris
attempted to exit the parking lot and Scott attempted to hem him in, the two
vehicles came into contact, causing minor damage to Scott’s cruiser. Harris reentered Highway 34 and continued to flee. The police blocked all intersections
ahead of Harris so that no traffic would cross the highway as Scott, now the
lead police vehicle, pursued Harris.
Scott radioed his sergeant for permission to make physical contact with
Harris’s vehicle in what is termed a “PIT” (precise intervention technique)
maneuver. A PIT maneuver is a driving technique designed to stop a fleeing
motorist safely and quickly by hitting the fleeing car at a specific point which
throws the car into a spin the driver cannot control, bringing the car to a stop.
Neither Scott nor the sergeant knew why the chase had been initiated, but
Scott wanted to end the chase as soon as possible because he felt that Harris
was acting in a reckless and dangerous manner. At the time of Scott’s request,
there were no motorists or pedestrians in the area because of the decision to
blockade intersections.
In granting Scott permission to make contact with Harris’s vehicle, the
sergeant stated over the radio, “Go ahead and take him out. Take him out.”
Scott determined that he could not perform the PIT maneuver because he
was going too fast. Instead, he decided to ram Harris’s rear bumper. As a
result, Harris lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an
embankment, and crashed. Harris was rendered a quadriplegic. No one else
was injured.
Under the vehicle pursuit policy of the Sheriff’s Office in effect at the time of
the incident, decisions regarding the initiation, continuation, and termination
of pursuits were left to the discretion of the officer and supervisor in the field.
The policy cautioned, however, that an officer should discontinue the pursuit
when “upon weighing the pertinent factors, the gravity of the offense and the
prospect of losing the suspect will not balance with the hazards to the Deputy
and the public” or “upon receipt of additional information once the pursuit
has begun that would allow later apprehension and successful prosecution.”
Most police departments across the country had such a policy in force at the
time of the incident.
Additionally, the policy stated that “the pursuing deputy should keep in
mind his personal safety and try everything within his authority to apprehend
the violator without resorting to a high-speed chase.” The Sheriff’s Office
admitted that officers did not receive training on these policies, including the
pursuit policy, nor were they trained to determine whether to make contact
with fleeing vehicles or in how to make such contact safely.
In October 2001, Harris sued Scott for violating his Fourth Amendment
rights to reasonable seizures by using excessive force to stop his vehicle. Scott
moved for summary judgment on Harris’s Fourth Amendment claim that
he was subjected to an unreasonable seizure because of Scott’s use of excessive
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force. Under established precedent it is clear that a seizure occurred when
Scott rammed Harris’s vehicle.
Claims of excessive force are subject to an objective reasonableness inquiry
established in Graham v. Connor in 1989. Under Graham,
the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation . . . . The “reasonableness” of a particular
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . . The calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.10

Graham instructs that the trier of fact must examine the facts carefully and
provides three examples of questions relevant to the inquiry: (1) how severe
was the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether he was attempting to evade
arrest by flight.11
In support of his motion, Scott contended that there was no factual dispute
about whether there was a constitutional violation because his use of force
was objectively reasonable given that Harris was driving recklessly at high
speeds and had hit Scott’s vehicle. In opposing the motion, Harris argued that
ramming his vehicle was unreasonable because Scott used excessive force to
stop Harris, who was merely a traffic offender, and because the officers could
have used alternative means to arrest him at a later time.
How should the Court rule on the motion for summary judgment?
Class Discussion
A classroom discussion of this scenario may be structured in many ways
based on one’s pedagogical goals.12 My goals are twofold: to help my students
understand how to apply the summary judgment standard in a fact-specific
context, and to teach them how to read images critically. I focus here on the
second goal.
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As a way for the students to increase their comfort with the summary
judgment standard, as well as with the law and the facts described in the
exercise, I begin the class by asking them first to articulate the best arguments
for granting summary judgment and then to articulate the best arguments for
denying summary judgment. I poll the class on how they would rule if they
were the district court judge.
Then I tell the students to assume that as part of his evidence on the summary
judgment motion, Scott includes the videos taken from the dashcams of the
two police cars that pursued Harris, first Reynolds’s and then Scott’s once he
took over the lead. I warn them that in the video they will see the crash that
ended the chase. I show enough of the video that they get a sense of both the
dullness and the drama, making sure to include the detour into the parking lot
where Scott takes over the pursuit.
I ask my students if the video changed anyone’s mind about whether to
grant or deny the motion for summary judgment, and I follow up with the
whole class about why it might. I lecture briefly about film and visual literacy
to provide students with a basic vocabulary for interpreting and interrogating
visual images.13 I try to impress upon them that this is now an important tool
for lawyers, and especially litigators, as images and film have come to play a
key role in legal proof and persuasion. Without a critical visual vocabulary, I
suggest, they will be more likely to “forget that cameras frame the images they
capture and render unseen those things outside the frame; that they always
situate the viewer relative to the image; that film and video narrate as well as
depict; and that images have different meanings in different contexts to people
with different ways of seeing.”14
We discuss how videos, like eyewitnesses, have one dominant perspective,
and that it is important to ask how the medium, the viewing context, and the
audience might inform (or distort) our perception. I guide them in thinking
about how they might assess film and video; they often suggest considering the
position of the camera, the angle, the way the images are framed, selected, and
edited. If I have laid the foundation properly, the students see that the very
techniques they are suggesting create opportunities for alternative narratives
of images and enhance their abilities as lawyers.
At this point I turn to the majority opinion in Scott v. Harris,15 and the
students are primed to see the visual naiveté of the Scott majority. They can
identify how eight Justices failed to differentiate between the chase itself, the
13.
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different testimonial narratives of the chase, and the video of the chase. It
is now striking to them that the Justices “were not only convinced that the
video had a ready-made meaning entirely apart from their own perceptions—
that it spoke for itself—but that this indisputable meaning so thoroughly
contradicted all competing facts in the record that they could decide the
summary judgment question themselves.”16 Most students see how odd it is
in the context of summary judgment for the video to operate “as a meta-fact
through which all other facts should be viewed and evaluated rather than as
yet another piece of evidence subject to competing interpretations.”17
I ask them to consider how they might have critically engaged and reoriented
the possible meaning of the dashcam video if they had been Harris’s lawyer.
Someone will mention that the video, shot from the squad car, places the
viewer in the position of law enforcement. I supplement this insight by asking
them to imagine how different the scene might have looked in a video taken
from the back of Harris’s car, from the side of the road, or from a helicopter.
Often a student will think about the framing of the video, appreciating that
the dashcam technology limits the field of vision, introduces distortions, and
makes some things in the periphery invisible. They will usually identify that
the lack of color, the confusing lights, and the sounds of the police radio all
influence our perception.
The question remains, will more sophisticated analysis of visual evidence
change how judges and juries view it? Empirical work done by Dan Kahan,
David Hoffman, and Donald Braman suggests that it might.18 These scholars
accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to the public to “see for themselves”
that the Scott video was conclusive. Kahan and his coauthors showed the Scott
v. Harris video to a diverse group of 1350 Americans. They found significant
differences in factual perception based on group identity and underlying
cultural and ideological values. These findings indicate that lawyers can help
translate visual evidence to juries and judges in ways that minimize and make
visible the cognitive biases that otherwise limit their reading of the image.
I conclude our classroom work on visuality by integrating that discussion
with the earlier doctrinal question of factual disputes at summary judgment
and the difficulties posed by the protean nature of facts. We return to the
material facts we had identified in discussing the reasonableness of the seizure:
whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
the public. The important question is whether the video provides conclusive
evidence of those facts, and the class is usually split on this question. If they
are split, wouldn’t it be likely that a jury would be as well? And if a jury would
be split, isn’t that precisely when a factual dispute is genuine and not ripe for
summary judgment? I’m curious whether they think that facts embodied in
16.
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visual evidence are more likely to seem material. I ask because I suspect that
this was partly what was going on in Scott—that the majority assumed it showed
them exactly what they were looking for. Yet for all the video did show—and it
could well be potentially probative on many issues—it is less than conclusive
on how necessary and dangerous the chase was and, therefore, on whether
Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable.19
In addition to allowing me to introduce my students to the complexity and
richness of summary judgment determinations, to the ambiguous role of facts
in relation to law, and to a set of critical tools for reading images, Scott v. Harris
also allows my students to see the violence of the law. They read about and
see the violent encounter between the Georgia police and Victor Harris. The
exercise, however, makes them aware of the normative violence of the Supreme
Court’s reading and resolution of that encounter in a way that would be less
accessible to them without it.20
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